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A long-standing gulf exists between the theory of contract formation and the empirical evidence 
concerning the determinants of the type and terms of contracts.  Although theory predicts a 
negative relationship between risk and effort incentives, the majority of empirical work finds a 
positive or no relationship (Prendergast, 2002).  The risk implications of sharecropping 
agreements, relative to other contract structure alternatives, have long been analyzed in the 
contract theory literature (e.g. Johnson, 1950; Cheung, 1965; Stiglitz, 1974; Newberry and 
Stiglitz, 1979). These theoretical studies tend to focus on the risk-sharing benefits provided 
through a share contract, weighing them against transaction costs. Arguments against the risk-
sharing motivations for contracts have been made in a number of papers by Allen and Lueck 
(1992, 1993, 1998, 1999, 2002). They argue that commodity, capital, and insurance markets are 
better equipped to address and mitigate the risks associated with agricultural production.  Thus, 
the importance of risk in determining contract type and terms will be lower in areas or regions 
where such markets are well developed. 
 
Empirical work on tenancy contract choice has provided mixed results in identifying the 
relationship between risk and contract choice (e.g. Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; Allen and 
Lueck, 1999; Fukunaga and Huffman, 2009; Paulson, Katchova, and Lence, 2010). Weaknesses 
in this empirical literature, however, abound.  For instance, investigators often use weakly 
correlated proxies for riskiness and risk aversion, e.g., crop type as a riskiness proxy and wealth 
to proxy for risk aversion.  Furthermore, with the exception  of Rainey et al. (2005), most 




Huffman and Just (2004) identify  five stylized facts that have emerged from the empirical 
literature on land tenancy.  Among these are 1) crop share (cash rent) contracts tend to dominate 
in developing (developed) areas, 2) crop share contracts persist in agriculture for a wide range of 
development status, and 3) a 50:50 sharing between landlord and tenant is the most common for 
observed crop share arrangements. In this paper, we revisit the potential risk management 
motivations of contracts in the context of land rental agreements in the Corn Belt and their 
relationship between a widely adopted risk management tool  –  federally subsidized crop 
insurance.  
 
Crop insurance is one of the primary components of a menu of programs comprising the federal 
safety net for agriculture in the U.S. Over the past 15 years, participation in the crop insurance 
program has increased considerably as new programs have continued to be developed which 
insure crop yields and revenues at both the farm and county levels, and premium subsidy rates 
offered to producers have been increased. Total acreage insured has increased from 
approximately 180 million acres in the late 90s to more than 250 million acres each year since 
2008. Total subsidy expenditures have increased even more dramatically from just under $ 1 
billion to nearly $5 billion annually over the same time period (RMA). To provide some 
perspective, crop insurance subsidies are now approximately on par with direct payments in 
terms of total annual expenditure. 
 
During this period of crop insurance program and participation expansion, farmland rental 
agreements have increasingly converted from share contracts to fixed  cash contracts.  For 
example, the average proportion of total acres operated under a cash rent agreement in Illinois 4 
 
has increased from 26% to 40% since 1997. This trend has been mirrored by a decline in the 
same measure for share rent agreements from 49% to 38% while land ownership rates among 
farm operators have remained relatively stable between 22 and 25%. These trends are illustrated 
in figure 1 using data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) Association 
and the Risk Management Agency of the USDA. Thus, the increases in risk protection achieved 
through the expansion in crop insurance participation may have been at least partially mitigated 
by increases in total risk exposure through the shift in types of rental agreements being used by 
producers.  
 
The relationship between crop insurance use and various types of other management decisions 
and practices has been a popular area of analysis for agricultural economists.  The impact of crop 
insurance on input use and other risk management decisions, such as hedging, have been 
particular areas of interest (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996; Coble et al., 2004; Coble, Heifner, and 
Zuniga, 2000; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Quinton, Karagiannis, and Stanton 1993; 
Roberts, Key, and O’Donoghue 2006; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Wu, 1999).  
 
The effect of crop insurance on agricultural tenancy agreements, however, has not been as 
thoroughly examined. This is especially surprising given the importance of land and rental 
contracts to U.S. crop producers. For example, land costs represent approximately 30 to 40% of 
total production costs for Illinois crop producers (FBFM). One exception is Paulson, Schnitkey, 
and Sherrick (2010) which provides a conceptual analysis of the potential risk-reduction offered 
by crop insurance, hedging, and options under both cash and share rental agreements. Consistent 
with the arguments made by Allen and Lueck, they find the marginal risk reduction offered by a 5 
 
crop share arrangement to be reduced when crop insurance and price risk management strategies 
are also available and utilized. 
 
The standard approach in the contract literature has been to compare contract types and risk 
changes across heterogeneous individuals in a single cross-section without addressing bias due to 
unobserved heterogeneity.  We, however, use farm-level panel data to examine how contract 
types change as riskiness changes within a farm over time with a fixed-effects model. Using a 
reduced form, instrumental variable approach to account for the endogeneity of crop insurance 
participation, we find that crop insurance participation is associated with the recent shift away 
from share rental agreements in Illinois. While the literature proxies for environmental risk with 
endogenously chosen characteristics such as crop choice or location, we utilize exogenous crop 
insurance program characteristics and historical performance measures as instrumental variables. 
We contend that our focus on agents’ exogenous, policy-induced crop insurance choices more 
directly accounts for risk attitudes than what is usually found in the literature.   
 
Our results support the notion that land rental agreements may be motivated, at least partially, by 
risk considerations. As the crop insurance program has expanded to provide additional programs 
such as revenue coverage, farmers have shifted away from share rent agreements. Perhaps more 
importantly, our approach allows us to comment on the efficiency of federally subsidized crop 
insurance as a mechanism to  reduce risk for agricultural producers. If expansion of crop 
insurance program offerings - and the resulting increase in federal outlays to support the program 
– has led to or allowed a shift towards the riskier fixed cash rent agreements, then the risk 
reduction benefits provided through the subsidization of crop insurance may be overestimated.  6 
 
Methods 
We adopt a reduced form approach where tenancy, measured as the proportion of rented acres 
which utilize a cash rent agreement, is a function of a set farm characteristics within a fixed 
effects framework.  The farm financial characteristics used as control variables are standard 
measures used in the agricultural finance literature which examines the relationship between 
farm tenancy, financial structure, and farm profitability (e.g, Ellinger and Barry, 1987; Garcia et. 
al, 1982; Rainey et al., 2005). These characteristics include a measure of crop insurance use, 
farm size, net worth, non-farm income, leverage, and the proportion of farm revenue derived 
from crop production. Farm size is measured as total tillable acres; the debt-to-asset ratio is used 
to measure farm leverage. 
 
, 0 1 ,2,3 ,4 ,5 6 ,,
,
it it it it it it it
it
D
CashRent Insurance Size Wealth NonFarm CropRev
A
ββ β β β β β ε = + + + + ++ +
 
Crop insurance participation is recorded in the FBFM database as the farmer’s share of total 
insurance premium expenditures. Recognizing that insurance expenditures - even for the same 
program and coverage level combination - vary by region, crop, and commodity price levels, we 
construct two alternative normalized insurance indexes to use as proxies for insurance 
participation or intensity which can be better compared across farms. The first index simply 
divides insurance expenditures by the insurance price for corn or soybeans for that crop year. 
The second index measure normalizes expenditures by both insurance price and the aggregate 
average insurance rate paid by producers in the county. Regression models are estimated using 
each of the three alternative measures for crop insurance participation. 
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An instrumental variables approach is used to account for the endogeneity of the insurance 
participation decision.  Based on recent studies of the determinants of crop insurance 
participation (Sherrick et al. 2004; Woodard and Paulson, 2010), county-level historical 
measures of program performance and insurance rates are used as exogenous instruments in a 
first-stage estimation of farm-level insurance use.  Performance measures include a rolling 3-
year average of the county loss ratio, the deviation of the farm’s current trend yield from an 
estimate of their actual production history (APH) yield guarantee, and a rolling average of the 
coefficient of variation of yields as a proxy for yield risk. The 65% base rate for the county is 




Our analysis utilizes farm-level data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management 
association which consists of more than 6,000 farmer cooperators who are provided with detailed 
accounting, tax, and other record-keeping services through a network of approximately 60 field 
staff.  The data includes an unbalanced panel of farm records covering the 2003 to 2008 crop 
years, and includes detailed financial, agronomic, and demographic information on the 
cooperating farm operators and households. Additional county-level crop insurance data from 
selected years of the RMA’s Summary of Business is used in constructing historical performance 
and rating measures which are used as instruments in our model.  These include historical 
premium, indemnity, and liability data reported for Illinois counties across insurance programs 
and coverage levels. 
 8 
 
Summary statistics for the regression variables are reported in table 1. The farms which 
participate in the FBFM program would generally be classified as relatively large, commercial 
grain operations.  The association includes roughly 20 percent of commercial grain farms in 
Illinois, providing an excellent representative sample of these types of operations. The 
percentage of acreage rented under a cash rent agreement averaged 47.3 percent from 2003 to 
2008, but year-by-year estimates show that this percentage has steadily increased over time. 
Insurance expenditures averages $19.47 per acre, but have increased from an average of about 
$13 per acre in 2003 to more than $30 per acre in 2008. Average farm size in the data is just over 
1,000 tillable acres while the average wealth level is approximately $1.35 million. The average 
non-farm income for the farm in our sample was $24,346 per year.  The farms in our data used 
an average of 31.9 percent debt to finance their assets, and an average of nearly 94 percent of 
total revenues are generated through crop production. 
 
Results 
The regression results for the tenancy equation are provided in table 2. The first column reports 
naive results where the endogeneity of the insurance decision is ignored. Columns three, four, 
and five report the two-stage IV regression results using the  natural logarithm of the  three 
alternative measures of insurance participation -  direct insurance expenditures per acre, 
expenditures normalized by insurance price, and expenditures normalized by insurance rate and 
price, respectively. 
 
Qualitatively, the results are consistent across all reported specifications. The prevalence of cash 
rental arrangements is estimated to decline in farm size.  Net worth and non-farm income are 9 
 
estimated to have a positive effect on the percentage of cash rented acres. Leverage and the share 
of revenue generated from crop production are also estimated to be positively related to the use 
of cash rent agreements. 
 
The estimated relationship between crop insurance use and cash rent agreements is also 
consistent across specifications.  In the naive regression, a 10 percent increase in insurance 
expenditures is estimated to increase the percentage of cash rented acres by 0.13 percent. In the 
IV regressions, the magnitude of this effect increases by a factor of three to five. In our sample, 
actual crop insurance expenditures, on average, nearly tripled  from 2003 to 2008 while the 
normalized insurance measures increased by approximately 10 percent. The regression results 
indicate this increase in insurance coverage contributed to a shift in rental arrangements resulting 
in an up to 3 percent average increase in cash rented acres. 
 
The results reported in table 2 based on the normalized measures of crop insurance participation 
used the insurance price and county insurance rate for corn policies.  Results were also estimated 
using the insurance price and county insurance rates for soybean policies  and were both 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in table 2. A variety of alternative 
specifications were also estimated as robustness checks, again resulting in very similar results as 




The relationship between risk and effort incentives occupies a central role in principal-agent 
theory. In the literature, land tenancy agreements epitomize this question. In spite of a decades-
old theoretical literature, the empirical evidence lends mixed, inconclusive support to the 
postulated risk-incentives tradeoff. In contrast to this empirical literature, we uniquely go to the 
heart of the issue by examining the relationship between risk-reducing crop insurance and the 
incentive-determining terms of farmland lease agreements. In addition to focusing squarely on 
the core issue, we overcome a major shortcoming of the empirical farmland tenancy literature by 
exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in risk-averse behavior, i.e., crop insurance coverage, to 
identify the risk-incentive relationship. We isolate the direct relationship between risk and effort 
incentives by using exogenous policy parameters to instrument for crop insurance coverage. We 
also account for time-invariant, unobserved characteristics that determine risk attitudes and land 
tenancy preferences with farm fixed effects. 
 
Our results provide clear, strong evidence for a risk-incentive tradeoff in farmland tenancy 
agreements. Federal crop insurance coverage increased substantially over  the last decade, 
providing farmers with better risk-management tools. Consequently, farmers moved away from 
risk-sharing share lease arrangements to riskier cash lease contracts. Our estimates indicate that 
the 150% increase in average crop insurance coverage between 2003-2008 explains nearly all of 
the 5 percentage-point increase in the share of leased land under cash agreements. Contrary to 
the implications of Prendergast (2002) and Allen and Lueck (2002), risk considerations appear to 
play a big role in determining the terms of farmland leases.  
 11 
 
The availability of crop insurance may be allowing producers to take on additional risk through 
the adoption of relatively riskier land rental arrangements.  This brings up important policy 
considerations given that the crop insurance program is federally subsidized and is now 
associated with total annual  government expenditures which are similar to those for farm 
commodity programs. The federal support provided for crop insurance provides producers with 
additional risk reduction, but may be leading to riskier land rental arrangements, reducing the 
efficiency of taxpayer support in providing risk management services to farmers. 
 
Further research is warranted to better identify the link between crop insurance participation and 
the choice of type of land tenancy contracts in practices.  The current study could be extended to 
include more data from earlier years or additional data collected from the farm management 
association cooperators on landlord characteristics.  While the results from our study likely 
extend to other Midwestern states which are dominated by corn and soybean production, 
additional studies could examine the issue for other regions, and for contracting for other types 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1. Rental agreement, land ownership, and crop insurance trends in IL, 1997-2009 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Selected Regression Variables 
   Mean  Median 
Proportion of Rented Acres 
Under Cash Rent Agreement  0.473  0.430 
Insurance Expenditures ($/acre)  19.47  16.57 
      Size (Acres)  1,027  857 
      Net Worth ($)  1,346,510  965,700 
      Net Nonfarm Income ($)  24,346  11,557 
      Debt/Asset Ratio  0.319  0.239 
      Crop Revenue Share  0.939  0.979 
Source: Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association 17 
 
Table 2. Selected Regression Results 







0.0560***  -  - 
(0.00283)    (0.00549) 
    Log(Normalized 
Insurance Expenditures)  
- 
 
-  0.0469***  0.0314*** 
     
(0.0126)  (0.00617) 
Log(Farm Size)  -0.0271*** 
 
-0.0156*  -0.0255***  -0.0264*** 
 
(0.00914)    (0.00934)  (0.00934)  (0.00920) 
Log(Net Worth)  0.0495*** 
 
0.0283***  0.0541***  0.0511*** 
 
(0.00409)    (0.00474)  (0.00393)  (0.00398) 
Non-farm Income   0.000817** 
 
0.000693*  0.000799**  0.000797** 
($10,000)  (0.000387)    (0.000392)  (0.000393)  (0.000389) 
Debt/Asset Ratio  0.134*** 
 
0.113***  0.134***  0.131*** 
 
(0.0188)    (0.0192)  (0.0191)  (0.0189) 
Crop Revenue Share  0.117*** 
 
0.0712***  0.145***  0.134*** 
   (0.0246)    (0.0254)  (0.0252)  (0.0246) 
Obs  12,087     11,548  11,548  11,548 
Farms  3,309 
 
2,770  2,770  2,770 
R-squared  0.033     0.007  0.003  0.021 
Notes: Dependent variable in each model is the percentage of rented tillable acres under a cash rent 
agreement. Farm-level data from Illinois-FBFM. County-level insurance data from RMA Summary of 
Business. Data span years from 2003-2008. Instruments include the county base rates for 65% corn and 
soybean yield coverage, 3-year rolling average loss ratio, coefficient of variation for county corn and 
soybean yields, and revenue insurance prices for corn and soybeans.  
Standard errors are reported below the estimates in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
1 Normalized by corn insurance price 
2 Normalized by corn insurance price and county insurance rate for corn policies 
   